There is a temptation to see a concept as a static ‘thing’ somehow stored in mind. One might imagine, for instance, that our concept of the word ‘hammer’ consists of visual memory for a hammer or series of hammers (or a ‘prototype’ or ‘schema’ of a hammer, whatever that should be). That we can think how this might be so, is not a good reason to adopt this idea. Indeed, it would be far better if should we discard this notion altogether. If we take language to be a skill, like tennis or painting, we see quickly how this idea breaks apart at the seams. For one does not have a static ‘concept’ of how one paints a landscape, or a fixed ‘concept’ of how one approaches a serve; rather one learns, over time, the toss of the ball, the arc of the back, the gentle shiting of weight, the flex of the wrist; and in all of this, there is the demand of sustained practice and coordination, the reproof and rebuke of time, and as ever, a great number of processes – physiological and mental – that contribute to the execution of the act (which is, almost certainly, imprecise). If a concept is a skill too, then it is a learned process; an active engagement; one of a suite of ways of representing the world.
On our confusion with words (and our idea that a word 'stands' for a thing), Wittgenstein said :
"This [confusion] is connected with the conception of naming as... an occult process. Naming appears as a queer connection of a word with an object. --[But] you really [only] get such a queer connexion when the philosopher tries to bring out the relation between name and thing by staring at an object in front of him and repeating a name or even the word "this" innumerable times. For philosophical problems arise when language goes on holiday. ...We can [of course] say the word "this" to an object, or as it were, address the object as "this"--[but this] is a queer use of the word, which doubtless only occurs in doing philosophy."